Perhaps the most salient feature of employee stock options is that they are essentially illiquid. Employees can capture value only through exercise of vested options. This characteristic provides the means through which employees are incentivized to remain with the company and work hard. The discount for liquidity is estimated as possibly as high as 20 percent.
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Spurred by the significant decline in technology stocks between 1999 and 2002, many employees found themselves holding large numbers of deep out-of-the-money options. Recognizing that such options provide few incentives and contribute to low morale, some firms have undertaken programs that permit employees to transfer these options to a financial institution.
By adding this element of liquidity, this feature greatly changed the nature of these options. This study examines one such program that was undertaken by Microsoft, one of the most high-profile companies in the world.
In July 2003 Microsoft announced that it was exploring an arrangement to offer employees cash to transfer certain out-of-the-money options to JPMorgan Chase (JPMC). This announcement was accompanied by a statement that Microsoft would no longer offer options, replacing them with restricted stock, and that it would retroactively expense its outstanding options, even though by accounting standards it was not yet required to do so.
The Microsoft employee option transfer program contained five important and somewhat complex features. First, each employee would be required to decide whether to tender the options before knowing how much would be offered. Second, the offer amount would be determined by inserting the average stock price over an upcoming period of fifteen trading days into an unspecified option pricing model. Third, if tendered, the maturities of most of the tendered options would be reduced. Fourth, JPMC would be selling the stock in large volume during the averaging period to comply with certain regulatory requirements and to establish a hedge. The employees assumed the risk that this selling pressure could have reduced the stock price. Fifth, an employee had to tender all options or none.
As seen in Figure 1 , Microsoft's stock had been generally falling from beginning of the year 2000, at which time it was about $60. The stock was at $27.70 on the day of the announcement.
The offer applied to vested and unvested options and share appreciation rights with exercise prices of at least $33 that expire on or after February 29, 2004 . Approximately 624 million options, about 40% of outstanding options and 6% of outstanding shares, held by about 37,000 of the approximately 55,000 employees of Microsoft were eligible for the program. The employees had to decide by November 12. The stock price was averaged over the period November 17 through December 8, resulting in an average price of $25.572. A total of 18,503 employees (about 50%) tendered about 344.6 million options, which was about 55% of the number that could have been tendered, and received payments of about $382 million, an average of $1.11 per option. Of this total, about $218 million was paid up front with the remainder scheduled to be paid with interest over several years, subject to continued employment with the company. The tendered options represented about 22% of Microsoft's outstanding options and about 3.3% of its outstanding shares.
Microsoft's employee option transfer program can be viewed as a watershed event that
could establish a new trend in the structure of employee options. Employees are typically required to hold their options at least until the end of a vesting period, at which time the employee can exercise them. In no cases, however, can employees sell their options. Barring the ability to synthesize a stock sale by either selling a delta-equivalent number of shares currently held or borrowed, employee options have no liquidity other than through exercise. Microsoft was not the first company to offer employees cash for their options and we take a brief look at two other, and much more successful, plans in the next section. But Microsoft was the first high-profile company to try such a plan. Interestingly, in December 2006, another high-profile company, Google, announced a similar program.
This paper is an examination of the Microsoft employee option transfer program.
Following a discussion of the characteristics of the program, we examine the performance of Microsoft stock during the averaging period, review the hedging strategy employed by JPMorgan
Chase during the averaging period, explore the valuation of options of this type, compare values offered with employee option values, and then examine the decision to tender all options or none.
We conclude with a post-mortem analysis of the deal, proposing a reason why problems occurred in the aftermath, and the lessons to be learned for future programs.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section I provides details of the offer.
Section II provides an empirical analysis of Microsoft's stock price behavior at critical times during the program. Section III examines the valuation of the option. Section IV contains a discussion of the results. Section V provides conclusions.
I. Background of the Microsoft Employee Option Transfer Program
Of course, Microsoft is well-known as the world's leading provider of software. 
A. Earlier Programs of Other Companies
As noted in the previous section, Microsoft was not the first company to offer its employees an opportunity to tender their options and receive cash prior to expiration. In August 2002, Siebel
Systems, a Silicon Valley software firm, offered its employees a cash payment of $1.85 or stock for each option turned in. The stock was at about $8, and the options had exercise prices of $40 to $109, with an average of around $50 and an average time to expiration of a little over eight years.
Employees due less than $5,000 would receive cash, and others would receive stock, half of which was unrestricted. The program was highly successful in that about 90% of eligible options were tendered by about 68% of employees. Siebels stated that the amount offered exceeded the BlackScholes values with expiration reduced to the expected exercise date for all eligible option tranches. 2 In almost all cases, employees would value an option at less than this adjusted BlackScholes value, so the amounts offered appeared to exceed the values to the employee.
About a month later, Nvidia, a Silicon Valley provider of graphic chips, offered its employees the opportunity to exchange their options for stock. The offer applied to options with exercise prices ranging from $27 to $65, with an average of about $36 and an average maturity of more than seven years. Nvidia stock, which had traded as high as $71 only eight months prior, was selling for less than $9 at the time of the offer. The offer was stated as the right to tender an option and receive stock worth 3.2 times the number of shares underlying the option divided by JPMC would be exclusive counterparty to the options but would not be considered as providing any legal, accounting, or tax advice. 5 The options would be converted into over-the-counter American-style options, with terms and conditions governed by the standard ISDA agreement.
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The transformed options were partially dividend-protected, allowing for an adjustment in exercise price at any later date if dividends were not the amounts anticipated and specified in the contract. This feature became particularly valuable to JPMC when Microsoft paid a special dividend of $3 a share in December 2 Because all option tranches met this criterion, Siebels was able to avoid special accounting charges. See Schwanhausser (2002) Microsoft determined that there were no legal requirements that it ask for shareholder approval, and it did not directly inform its shareholders, although there was much publicity about the program while it was going on.
C. Terms of the Offer to Employees
Each employee would be permitted to decide until midnight November 12, 2003 whether to tender her options. A decision to tender any options applied to all options held by the employee, an important point because some options might be worth tendering while others might not. If the employee made the decision before the deadline, he could revoke the decision up until the deadline. 
D. Determining the Amount Offered for an Option
Microsoft stated that the option value offered to the employees would be determined "in part by reference to Black-Scholes and other option pricing models." (Microsoft, 2003a) . As noted, these options were American-style, so the reference to "other option pricing models" is most likely a reference to a binomial or finite-difference model that captures early exercise, which would be induced only by dividends. But the impact of dividends on this option is small. As we examine in more detail later, Microsoft had been paying a very low dividend and tendered options are protected against changes, further minimizing the effect of early exercise on the option value.
The amount offered for the options would be based on the average closing price from the first business day following the second calendar day after the deadline and ending 15 trading days later. Given the Thanksgiving holiday, this would define the averaging period as November 17
through December 8, though extendable as late as December 15 if trading disruptions occur, which did not happen. The averaging procedure would be based on rounding up the price to the nearest 1/10,000 of a dollar. As noted above, the computation of the option value would be performed with an attenuation of the time to expiration.
The timing of the payment to an employee was specified by a schedule. If the amount owed an employee were less than $20,000, then the employee would receive the money more or less as soon as possible after the amount owed is determined and no later than December 31, 2003. If the amount owed an employee exceeded $20,000, the employee would receive one-third of the amount by December 31. The remaining amounts would be paid with interest at the Treasury bill rate in either one or two installments, depending on the employee's rank, by December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2006, with potentially different terms for employees of different countries. All amounts paid would be net of withholding taxes and some other unspecified fees.
A potentially important feature is that the employee would be required to maintain employment with Microsoft in order to receive these deferred payments. The more the employee is owed, the longer she would have to continue working for Microsoft to receive full payment.
Thus, for some employees the program had a vesting requirement.
E. Microsoft's Advice to Employees
Employees were given a web site from which they could determine how much they would receive, given the terms of the option and the average stock price over the upcoming averaging Interestingly, Microsoft did not make any statements to suggest that the averaging process would help the employee. Because an average price over a period of time is less volatile than the price at the end of the period, the averaging process reduces the risk from unusual price behavior near the end of the averaging period and makes it easier for the employee to forecast the value of the option.
In an email to employees at the time of the announcement, CEO Steve Ballmer (Ballmer (2003) ) stated that options with exercise prices of $33 could likely be sold for about $2, with options with exercise prices of $42 worth about $0.60, and options with exercise prices of $45 valued at about $0.25. Of course, these figures were just rough estimates designed to give the employees a general idea of how much money they might receive.
The agreement entered into by Microsoft and JPMC specified that the latter would engage in sales of stock during the averaging period. Microsoft alerted employees that JPMC would sell an approximately equal number of shares each day during the averaging period and would then buy back some of these shares. It also noted that JPMC might also use derivatives, the trading of which could have some impact on the stock price. These sales would be executed for the purpose of complying with certain regulatory requirements and ultimately establishing a hedge against the bank's acceptance of the short option positions. Microsoft heavily advised its employees that this selling pressure could result in significant declines in the price of the stock, and therefore lead to a lower average price and lower option value than might otherwise be expected.
Microsoft made clear that it was making no recommendation on whether an employee should take the offer. It advised employees that a decision should be a function of a number of factors including the outlook for the stock, the likelihood of continuing employment, the employee's risk tolerance, the current option vesting period, the employee's need for cash, and tax considerations. Microsoft also identified for the employees the standard variables that affect the value of a traded option. It mentioned the Black-Scholes model but noted that the model was not entirely appropriate for non-traded options. Microsoft also provided a brief explanation of the difference between implied and historical volatility.
Microsoft requested and received a private letter ruling (PLR) from the IRS that stated that the employees would indeed be taxed on the amounts offered. Another concern, however, was the possible applicability of the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt, in which income offered but not accepted can be taxed. The PLR, however, clarified that an employee who did not choose to tender would not be taxed at that time.
F. The Impact on Microsoft
Microsoft provided a table showing the amounts it expected to pay, given various average stock prices, assuming all options were tendered. Estimates range from $313 million based on an average stock price of $22 and option value of $0.50 to almost $2 billion based on an average stock price of $32 and option value of $3.18. Microsoft estimated its overall costs at $4.5 million, not counting fees of $6 to 15 million, and $0.02 per share sold. Microsoft also paid an SEC registration fee of about $1.4 million for filing form S-3, to be discussed later. These figures suggest that total costs to Microsoft would range from $11-$33 million. Given the effectiveness of the program with about 55% of options tendered, total costs should have been around $22 million.
As noted, at the time of the announcement Microsoft stated that it would begin expensing its employee options. As a result of the transfer program, it had to accelerate the expensing of unvested tendered options, which resulted in a charge to earnings, a tax deduction, and adjustments to its deferred tax account.
G. Regulatory Approval
As Hall (2004) Although a delta hedge is intended to be risk-free, no delta hedge is ever perfect. In addition, there are some risks faced by JPMC in setting up the delta hedge, which we shall examine.
Because of the large size of the transaction, JPMC could not sell short all of the shares at the instant at which it took title to the options. It, thus, began selling short during the averaging period and priced the offer based on the average stock price during the averaging period. Prior to the beginning of the averaging period and before the time at which it determined the number of options that would be tendered, it filed a registration statement with the SEC to sell 635 million shares, which was slightly above the maximum number that could be tendered. To establish a delta hedge, it would need to sell no more than this number of shares. In all likelihood it would sell less, perhaps far less, given that the options were deep out-of-the-money. JPMorgan has informed us that it intends to enter into market transactions to hedge its exposure to the ownership of the Eligible Options, as amended and restated. These market transactions will include sales of our common stock that will take place during the Averaging Period pursuant to a registration statement that we filed with the SEC.
During the Averaging Period, JPMorgan expects to sell shares of our common stock pursuant to the registration statement to establish its desired hedge position. JPMorgan expects to sell approximately equal numbers of shares on each day during the Averaging Period. These sales could have the effect of decreasing the market price of our common stock. If these sales decrease the market price of our common stock during the Averaging Period, this would cause you to receive a lower price for your Eligible Options under the Stock Option Transfer Program.
During the Election Period and Averaging Periods and after the end of the Averaging Period, JPMorgan also expects to sell additional shares pursuant to the registration statement to comply with regulatory requirements. These additional shares, together with the shares JPMorgan sells to establish its desired hedge program, will equal the total number of shares underlying all Eligible Options that are transferred under the Stock Option Transfer Program. The sales of these additional shares will not be made to establish a hedge position. As a result, JPMorgan expects to purchase a number of shares in secondary market transactions approximately equal to the number of these additional shares it sells, on the same days it sells additional shares, so that JPMorgan will be in its desired hedge position after taking in account all such additional sales and purchases. The number of shares purchased may be a significant percentage of the number of shares sold under the registration statement and, depending on market factors and the terms of the transferred options, is likely to represent substantially more than half of the total number of shares sold under the registration agreement. The sales and purchases that are not made to establish JPMorgan's hedge position may take place, before, during and after the Averaging Period.
During the Averaging Period and after the end of the Averaging Period, JPMorgan also may buy or sell additional shares of our common stock or other securities or buy or sell options or futures contracts or enter into swaps or other derivative securities in order to adjust its hedge position with respect to the Eligible Options. JPMorgan also may be active in the market for our common stock other than in connection with hedging activities in relation to the Stock Option Transfer Program. JPMorgan will make its own determination as to whether, when or in what manner any hedging or market activities in our securities will be conducted. Any of JPMorgan's market activities with respect to our common stock may affect the market price and volatility of our common stock.
Thus, it would appear that to comply with regulatory requirements, JPMC would need to sell as many shares as options tendered, but that any excess shares would be repurchased on the same day. Ultimately it would be left with a delta-hedged position. 10 Let us analyze JPMC's position in setting up the hedge. First, we assume a zero interest rate, which is reasonable given the low rate of interest at that time and the very short length of the averaging period.
Let S 0 be the price at the beginning of the averaging period, S τ be the price at the end of the averaging period, and S be the average stock price during the period. Although the number of options tendered was 345 million, we standardize this analysis with an assumption of one share.
At the end of the period, JPMC will need h τ shares where h τ is the appropriate delta-hedge ratio at the end of the period and is based on the stock price S τ . Of course, it does not know this stock price, so it does not know this hedge ratio at the beginning of the period. We assume that it estimates that the stock price at the end of the period will be the stock price at the beginning of the period, which is probably a reasonable belief given the short length of the period. Therefore, the estimated hedge ratio is h 0 , that is, conditional on S 0 .
During the averaging period, it sells short h 0 shares in total, an equal number each day. At the end of the period, the cash proceeds from these sales will be h 0 S . It then determines that the actual number of shares required is h τ , which could mean that it must short more shares or that it must buy back some shares. We can express this effect by stating that it must short h τ -h 0 additional shares at the price S τ . It would then be short h 0 + h τ -h 0 = h τ , the proper number of shares. It will then acquire an option paying c( S ) and receive an option worth c(S τ ).
We can now determine an expression for JPMC's position when the hedge is in place. It will have a liability of h τ S τ short shares and assets as follows, + h 0 S , cash proceeds received from the short sales 
Subtracting liabilities from assets gives a net position of h 0 ( S -S τ ) -(c( S ) -c(S τ )). Define this expression as the gain to JPMC:
In a world of perfect foresight, the initial hedge ratio h 0 would equal the final hedge ratio h τ . In that case, the gain would be
, which would be a perfect delta-hedge position for an infinitesimal difference between S and S τ . So for a perfect hedge,
The gain to JPMC can now be restated as
G h S S h S S S S h h
By definition, these hedge ratios are
The change in the hedge ratio h 0 is
This expression is the option's gamma times dS 0 and must equal dh 0 = h τ -h 0 . Thus,
This expression provides a simple approximation of the gain or loss from the strategy to establish the hedge. Because gamma is always positive for long option positions, we see that JPMC benefits if the final price is lower than the initial price and the average price is higher than the final price, or if the final price is higher than the initial price and the average price is lower than the final price.
We can obtain an estimate of the performance of the hedge for JPMC with a Monte Carlo simulation. Reasonable random values can be generated to represent a path of stock prices from which we obtain an estimate of the average stock price, final stock price, final delta, and other values as required to determine the profitability of the strategy. One immediate problem encountered, however, is that each trial results in an average stock price that must be inserted into an American option pricing model. The most likely candidate for an American option pricing model is a binomial tree that reflects the potential for early exercise. Unfortunately, the attachment of a binomial tree to a Monte Carlo simulation creates an extremely intense and slow computational procedure. As an alternative, the very low dividend of Microsoft and the dividend protection feature of the agreement mean that the Black-Scholes model could be a reasonable proxy for an American option price. We compare Black-Scholes values with American option values obtained using a binomial tree for a range of exercise prices and expirations appropriate for these options and find a maximum difference of less than one cent in price, less than 0.06 in delta, and less than 0.0002 in gamma.
11 These values are sufficiently small that we can henceforth price the options quite accurately using the Black-Scholes model.
For the simulation of JPMC's hedging strategy, we assume that the options have an exercise price of $40 and are converted to three-year options. 12 The simulation uses 100,000 trials and assumes that 344.6 million options are tendered. The results are summarized in Table I . At the beginning of the averaging period, the stock is at $25.98, the delta is 0.3011, and the gamma is 0.0254. Recall that each simulation generates an average price over the 15-day period and a final price. We observe that the average final price and the average of the average price are both within pennies of the original price. The average final price, however, has a volatility of $1.87, while the average of the average price has a much lower volatility of $1.12. The average final delta is 0.0055 higher than the original delta, and the volatility of the delta is about 0.05. As noted above, the performance of JPMC's hedging strategy is the product of the gamma and the differences between the initial price and final price and the average price and final price. The average difference between the initial price and final price is -$0.03 and the average difference between the average price and final price is -$0.01. Hence, the average profit is positive. We see that this average profit is about $14.65 million with a standard deviation of $23.05 million.
Note that the two price differences are positive about 50% of the time and negative about 50% of the time, but the overall profit is positive over 82% of the time. Hence, the two price differences tend to be both positive or both negative at the same time. These two conditions that lead to positive profits are combined with
first condition is simply that the price falls over the averaging period and the average price is higher than the final price. The second is that the price rises over the averaging period and the average price is lower than the final price. These conditions are frequently met because a random variable with a positive drift will often have its average lie between the initial and final values.
In addition to profits from the trading strategy, JPMC would collect interest on the proceeds from the short sales, which was not factored into the above analysis. Thus, we see that,
while JPMC does bear some risk, the strategy to establish the hedge would appear to have great potential. As noted above, JPMC does bear some second-order (gamma) risk, which we shall discuss later. In addition, it assumes some volatility (vega) risk, which we shall also cover later.
II. Market Activity During the Averaging Period
An important question is whether the market could absorb the intense short selling that would occur in this stock during the averaging period. Microsoft is certainly one of the most liquid of all stocks, and it is tempting to dismiss this issue, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight. But Microsoft provided extensive warnings to employees about the possible effect of JPMC's trading on the offer price of the options. Consider the following language directed at the employees, which appeared in the tender offer (United States Securities and Exchange Commission
JPMorgan has informed us that it intends to enter into market transactions to hedge its exposure to the ownership of the Eligible options, as amended. … If these sales decrease the market price of our common stock during the Averaging Period, this would cause you to receive a lower price for your Eligible Options under the Stock Option Transfer program. … Any of JPMorgan's market activities with respect to our common stock may affect the market price and volatility of our common stock. (pp. 10-11)
JPMorgan expects to sell approximately equal numbers of shares each day during the Averaging Period. These sales could have the effect of decreasing the market price of our common stock. It is possible that the Average Closing Price will be substantially below prevailing prices during the Election Period. It is also possible that prices during the Averaging Period could rise so that some Eligible Options would be in-the-money or close-to-being-in-the-money. (p. 15)
It would seem virtually impossible for employees to ignore this concern.
A. Trading Activity During the Averaging Period
As described in the previous section, during the averaging period of November 17 through December 8, JPMC was selling the stock to establish its hedge. Prior to knowing the number of options tendered, Microsoft had registered with the SEC for JPMC to sell up to 635 million shares.
It committed for JPMC to sell as many shares as were tendered, which exceeds the number needed to establish the delta hedge. As noted, it stated that JPMC would buy back the excess shares the same day it sold them. At the beginning of the averaging period, JPMC knew how many shares were tendered. It committed to sell an equal number of shares each day during the averaging period to establish an approximately delta-hedged position. At the end of the averaging period, the average price would be known, which would determine the amount to be offered for the options and the delta of the options. At the end of the averaging period, JPMC would then make some final trades to fine-tune its position. As previously shown, a rough approximation of the delta of a typical out-of-the-money three-year Microsoft option would be about 0.3. Thus, JPMC would need to sell short about 103 million shares over the averaging period or about 7 million a day. Of course at the end of the averaging period it would determine the correct amount it needed and would make some residual trades to get the delta-hedged position finalized. Having committed to sell 345 million shares over the averaging period, it would therefore sell an additional 242 million shares at a rate of about 16 million a day, but it would repurchase these shares on the same day. Hence, these seemingly excess shares, sold to comply with regulations and bought back, would affect volume but would not likely affect price.
We might expect most of the buying activity to finalize the hedge to occur in the first few days of the period following the averaging period. 13 Starting with the averaging period, we divide all other prior days in 2003 into non-overlapping 15-day periods, going back to the beginning of March, which is well past the February 18 date of a 2-for-1 stock split.
13 Of course, in maintaining a delta hedge, JPMC will trade on a regular basis throughout the remaining life of the option, buying and selling shares as needed. But the number of shares bought and sold would probably not be large relative to other trading in the stock. Microsoft exchange-traded and other over-the-counter options are delta-hedged on a regular basis by options dealers. It is the large number of trades required in a short period of time to put the hedge in place that could have a significant impact on the price.
The average daily volume during the averaging period was about 87 million shares. Figure   2 shows the average daily volume for these 15-day periods. Note that the averaging period had the largest average daily volume, but there is an upward trend in volume from the period ending August 21. Note also that volume for the 15-day period following the averaging period is down substantially from the averaging period. Recall that, JPMC would be selling about 242 million shares during the averaging period to comply with regulations, but it would also buy these back.
Purchases and sales would amount to about 32 million a day. It would also sell about 7 million shares daily to establish its delta hedge. Thus, an approximation of incremental daily volume is about 39 million shares. If these shares are removed, the daily average during the averaging period is about 48 million. Average daily volume for the other periods is about 61 million shares. million for the full 15-day period following the averaging period. Thus, it appears that there was a large amount of volume following the averaging period, which is likely to have come from trades by JPMC to set its delta hedge in place.
B. Stock Price Performance during the Averaging Period
Now let us examine the stock price behavior during the averaging period. Using the same set of 15-day periods, we estimate the volatility of daily returns. During the averaging period, the annualized volatility was 18.37%. Figure 3 shows the volatility of contiguous 15-day periods.
Note that the averaging period had one of the lowest volatilities of all of the 15-day periods. The volatility for the two surrounding periods is quite low as well. Volatility for the period following the averaging period, which could include the effect of the aforementioned buying pressure, was only 9.21%. For the period in 2002 comparable to the averaging period, the volatility was 29.52%.
While seasonality could explain some of this effect, there is certainly no indication that volatility during the averaging period was unusually high. The additional liquidity provided by JPMC could have even contributed to lower volatility. In addition, buying in the period following the averaging period could also have contributed to lower volatility. Now let us examine the performance of the stock. On November 14, the day before the averaging period began, the stock closed at 25.50. On December 8, the end of the averaging period, the stock closed at 26.24, a return over 2.9% over the averaging period. By comparison, the S&P 500 increased about 1% over that period. Figure 4 .A shows the abnormal returns (ARs)
for each day of the averaging period estimated with the Fama-French three-factor model. There is no indication that the ARs are uniformly positive or negative and none are statistically significant.
Eight are positive and seven are negative, with the average being 0.08%. Figure 4 .B shows the abnormal returns for the period following the averaging period. Note that there are large positive abnormal returns for the first two days following the averaging period. These are likely to derive from JPMC's buying pressure. On the third day, however, the return is negative. For the full period, there are seven positive and eight negative abnormal returns with none significant.
In summary, these findings suggest that stock price performance during the averaging period was not unusual. Volume was somewhat higher, and the stock had a return of almost 3%
and a relatively low volatility (compared to earlier months) of about 18%. For the period following the averaging period, the stock had a return of 4.9% and a volatility of 9.21%. It appears that the market easily absorbed the intense volume of short selling and may have even benefited from it.
III. Valuation of the Option
To value the options we need to know their characteristics. We start with the fact that were at least some options with these high strikes, we will examine options struck at 50 and 60
with three-year maturities, vested in 0.5 years. The lion's share of the options is likely to be in the strike range of 33 to 45. Given when the stock was in this range, these options could have maturities of from two to five years. For options in this range, we will examine strikes of 33, 40, and 45. Considering the dates on which the stock was at these prices, representative maturities would be two and five years for the 33s, and 2.5 and 3.5 years for the 40s and 45s. The two-year options are vested, the three-year options vest in 0.5 years, and the five-year options vest in 2.5
years. For options with maturities of more than three years, offer prices are based on a reduced maturity of three years as prescribed in the agreement.
We also need risk-free rates for these time periods. Microsoft filed a document called "Call Option Transaction Confirmation with JPMorgan Chase Bank" with the SEC (Microsoft (2003c)) that states that the risk-free rate would come from the U. S. Dollar LIBOR swap curve, converted to a continuously compounded equivalent. These figures are obtained from the Federal Reserve's data base for maturities of 2, 3, 4, and 5. For options with maturities of 2.5 and 3.5 years, we round down to the two-and three-year rates, respectively. Option valuation results are known to be not particularly sensitive to the risk-free rate.
The most critical variable in pricing an option is, of course, the volatility. Figure 5 shows the rolling 60-trading day volatility of the continuously compounded return on the stock for the last six months of 2003. Volatility averaged from 23 to 32 percent, with a sharp spike in late October, which probably corresponded to the first quarter earnings announcement that generated record trading volume. Sixty-day volatility was 30.8% on the decision day, November 12. We shall use a volatility of 30% but will also check the sensitivity of the results by examining volatilities of 25% and 35%.
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Awash with almost $50 billion in cash, Microsoft began paying dividends in February 2003, but its dividend payment pattern has been somewhat erratic.
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We assume that the annual dividend of $0.24 paid in 2003 will be continued. Based on the stock price of $25.98 on November 12, the annual dividend is equivalent to a yield of 0.92%. We round this figure to 1%.
A. The Effect of Uncertainty in the Decision Process
As noted, the employee makes the decision by November 12, the stock is then averaged over the period November 17 through December 8, and the amount offered is determined on or 16 Alternative volatility estimation periods of 30-and 90-days reveals similar figures for historical volatility on November 12. Given the relative inaccessibility of historical option data bases, implied volatilities would not be easy to obtain, but it is unlikely that implied volatilities would go beyond the range we use here. to exchange a standard employee option for the cash value of a standard liquid option on December 8. Such a transaction is similar in concept to the exchange option of Margrabe (1978) , which provides the right but not the obligation to exchange one risky asset for another. The decision to tender is itself an option. The employee in effect holds an option granting the right to enter into an exchange forward contract, which itself is a commitment to tender one security -the employee option -and receive another -the cash value of a European option.
For example, suppose on November 12, the employee estimates the forward value of the option as $2 and the forward value of the offer as $2.50. On that basis, assume the employee tenders the option. Now assume the stock price over the averaging period is such that the amount actually offered is less than the value of the option at the end of the averaging period. The employee would then regret having tendered. Clearly tendering is not risk-free.
Let us compare this decision with a similar but simpler position, that of the holder of a more traditional call option on a forward contract. When the option expires, let the forward contract have positive value so the option would be exercised. A long forward contract would be established but might ultimately expire at a loss. When the optionholder exercises, however, he can neutralize the risk by entering into an offsetting forward contract. Barring default risk, the expiration value of the forward contract would be secured. But the forward contract underlying the option to tender the employee option is not so easily hedgeable. The employee is committed to giving up the employee option, but he holds that option so he is hedged on the outflow component of the deal. To hedge the offer, however, the employee would have to create a short position in an over-the-counter call option identical to the one he would tender or a deltareplicating short position in an exchange traded option, such as a LEAP. Moreover, these hedge options would technically have to be priced using the averaging method. These types of transaction would be essentially impossible for most employees. Hence, the decision to tender is a risky one, and the forward offer value would need to exceed the forward employee value by enough for the employee to accept the risk of tendering.
For now, we shall disregard this risk and will simply estimate the forward values of the offer and the employee option. We will address the risk later. Replicating the manner in which the employee would decide whether to tender, on November 12 we determine the offer price for December 8, conditional on information available on November 12. This procedure yields the forward offer price. We then determine the forward value of the option to the employee. On the basis of these two values, we assume that the employee would make a decision of whether to tender or not.
B. The Effect of the Averaging Period
Options that pay off based on the average stock price over the option's life, or a defined period of time during the option's life, are called Asian options. These options are not easy to value. The standard lognormal diffusion so commonly assumed for modeling the return on a stock is not lognormal upon addition so that arithmetic average of a lognormal variable is not welldefined. Although a number of approximations are commonly used, probably the most popular method for pricing Asian options is Monte Carlo simulation. 18 Terminal stock prices are randomly generated, the option payoff for each stock price is determined, and the average option payoff is discounted back to the present at the risk-free rate. While the Microsoft offer has some properties of an Asian option, it is not exactly a standard Asian option because the expiration payoff of the latter is a function of the average price, while the expiration payoff of the Microsoft offer is essentially an ordinary American option.
To value the Microsoft employee option offer, we employ a Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 trials. Each trial generates a path of sequential stock prices. The average of these prices is then inserted into the Black-Scholes model.
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The overall average value is the value of the option. We do not discount this value back to the beginning of the averaging period, because the employee receives the money around the end of the averaging period or later with interest. For comparison purposes, we then find the Black-Scholes value, positioned on December 8 with various expirations for the option mentioned but using the current stock price, $25.98 on November 12. In effect, this valuation using the Black-Scholes model makes the assumption that the current stock price is an unbiased estimate of the average stock price over the short averaging period. Note that the averaging process has little effect on the value of the option. The Monte Carlo prices are slightly higher but never higher by more than $0.02. The averaging process has so little effect on the option price because the averaging period begins immediately and is extremely short relative to the life of the option, and because the options are deep out-of-the-money, which means that they have relatively low deltas and are, therefore, less sensitive to the stock price.
The simulated average price for the entire set of 2.5 million trials is $25.99, essentially the same as the price at the beginning of the averaging period of $25.98. Separate tests using much longer averaging periods show that the effect of the averaging period can be greater, but these cases do not apply in the Microsoft transfer program. Given that the simulated values are so close to the Black-Scholes values, we can safely proceed using only the Black-Scholes values.
C. The Value of an Option to an Employee
While Microsoft would effectively offer its employees the Black-Scholes value of the option, with reduced maturity, we must determine how much value the employee would assign to the option. There is an extensive body of literature on the valuation of employee options. Typical models take into account such factors as the option's illiquidity and any vesting period and even psychological factors. Models are found in the works of Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Carpenter (1998) , Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) , Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), Meulbroek (2001) , and Hall and Murphy (2002) . We use the model of Hall and Murphy. This model, as described in their appendix, fits a binomial tree to the stock price so that the stock price evolves with an expected return and volatility equal to the expected return from the Capital Asset Pricing
Model and the volatility that would be used in the Black-Scholes model. The employee values the option at expiration by determining the exercise value and stepping backwards through the binomial tree, exercising when the expected utility from exercise exceeds the expected utility from holding on to the option. The employee's utility function is of the power utility form,
where W is the amount of wealth being evaluated and λ is the employee's coefficient of relative risk aversion. Working backwards through the tree, the option value is determined as the certainty equivalent amount that, if received at time 0 and invested in risk-free bonds, would produce the same expected utility as holding the option and following the optimal exercise strategy. Exercise cannot be done at any time step prior to the vesting period. Option value will be greatest when the option makes a strong contribution to moving the employee from a nonoptimal asset allocation in the direction of an optimal one. Employees with excessive (deficient) market exposure will find the option less (more) desirable and will want to exercise (hold on to) it if vested or possibly tender (hold on to) it in the presence of a transfer program.
The Hall-Murphy model requires such variables as the number of options, the employee's non-option wealth, and the amount of the non-option wealth invested in the stock with the remainder assumed invested in risk-free bonds. It also requires an estimate of the stock's expected return. Thus, to value the option we need option-specific information (exercise price, time to expiration, vesting period, and number of options held), stock-specific information (stock price, beta for use in the CAPM to estimate expected return, dividend yield, and volatility), and employee-specific information (risk aversion, non-option wealth, and asset allocation of non-option wealth among stock and risk-free bonds). Of course, with a binomial model we must also decide on the number of time steps.
For the option-specific information, we have already discussed the likely exercise prices, times to expiration, and vesting periods. For the number of options held, we note that there are 624 million eligible options held by about 37,000 employees, an average of 16,864 per employee.
We round this figure to 15,000 but also examine holdings of 10,000 and 20,000. The stock-specific assumptions are already stated, except for the beta. Microsoft's beta is estimated over the 60-trading day period from August 20 through November 12 and the S&P 500 as the benchmark portfolio. We obtain an estimate of 1.66. A market risk premium of 6.5% is used, as this is the estimate used by Hall and Murphy. For the employee-specific information, we assume risk aversion of 2.5 but also examine coefficients of 2.0 and 3.0. The non-option wealth figure is problematic. About 75% of Microsoft's employees live in the Seattle area. We would also presume that most employees who receive options are relatively well-paid. Average household income in the Seattle area in 2003 was about $65,000 and the median house value was about $330,000. Of course some of this value is debt financed. But most employees would also have retirement accounts. Lacking any specific data to arrive at a more accurate estimate, we shall use $300,000 as the base figure for outside wealth and also test values of $100,000 and $500,000. The most important point is not the exact wealth but the effect of changing the wealth. For the standard case, we assume that this non-option wealth is invested in risk-free bonds at the start but also examine the cases where 20% and 50% is invested in Microsoft stock. Proceeds from early exercise are assumed to be invested in risk-free bonds.
One limitation of the analysis is termination risk. If the employee resigns or is fired, he could lose the opportunity to exercise the option. But this risk would also apply if he tenders the option. Recall that if the amount owed to an employee for a tendered option exceeds $20,000, a portion is deferred as much as three years. Although these adjustments are not likely to offset perfectly, they create a comparable risk, the net effect of which should be of secondary importance.
Even if we did apply a probability of termination, such a probability does not represent a risk to which the employee is neutral; hence, an arbitrary application of a probability of termination to an option pricing model is not without some concern. Accordingly, we disregard the probability of termination. Table III shows the offers compared to the values assessed by the employee for the base case for the different tranches of options with three volatilities: 25%, the benchmark 30%, and 35%. With each combination the offer value is lower than the employee value. With but one 20 Technically, there is one point in which termination risk might not be offsetting. If the option's original life exceeds three years, the employee might factor a risk of termination beyond three years into his valuation of the option, while the amount owed if the options are tendered might be so small that none of it would be deferred. We ignore this minor effect. Other than the potential for termination to eliminate any amounts owed, the simple deferral of the payments does not affect the value of the option because Microsoft will pay the employees the remaining amounts plus interest at the Treasury bill rate. small exception, the absolute difference between the offer and the value is smaller the higher the volatility. The reason is because of the two-way effect of volatility on an employee option. Like a standard option, higher volatility increases the value of an employee option. But an employee option is valued using risk preferences and not arbitrage, so higher volatility generally reduces the value of the option. For the options examined here, option value increases with volatility, but the effect is mitigated somewhat by the negative effect of volatility. Overall, these factors combine to make the offer more attractive the higher the volatility.
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D. Comparison of Offer Values to Employee Valuations
Although all of the options are unattractive for tendering, certain ones emerge as the least and most attractive. The options with maturities more than three years have their maturities reduced to three years. These three options are the three least desirable options for tendering for all volatilities. For both the 25% and 30% volatilities, the highest strike option, the 60, is the most attractive offer, while the 45-strike, 2.5-year maturity is the second most attractive. The 50-strike, three-year maturity is third. For the 35% volatility, however, the 33-strike, two-year maturity is the most attractive, while the 45-strike, 2.5-year maturity is second.
Of course these conclusions are based on the benchmark case. In Tables IV and V we vary certain inputs associated with the employee. To conserve space, we show only the difference between the offer and the value assessed by the employee. Table IV contains two panels. Panel A varies the number of options held from 10,000 to 15,000 (the benchmark case) to 20,000. Again, none of the offers are sufficiently attractive for the employee to accept. The offers are more attractive, however, the more options owned, which is due to the greater exposure to the stock.
For the case of 10,000 and 15,000 options, the most attractive offer is the 60-strike, three-year maturity, and second is the 45-strike, 2.5-year maturity. With 20,000 options, the most attractive is a tie between the 33-strike, two-year maturity, and the 45-strike, 2.5-year maturity, with the former being slightly less negative when the results are carried out to more decimal places. For all cases, the three options that have a maturity reduction are the least desirable to tender.
In Panel B of Table IV, the employee's non-option wealth is varied. Recall that we assume all of this wealth is invested in risk-free bonds. For the first time, we see that some offers are attractive, and the attractiveness varies inversely with wealth. For the employee with wealth of $100,000, almost all of the offers are attractive, though just barely. Thus, we might expect that options tendered were likely to be tendered by employees with the least amount of external wealth. The reason for this result is that for a given number of options, the exposure is greater the lower the wealth, so eliminating this exposure can be justified. For wealth of $100,000, the most attractive is the 33-strike, two-year maturity. For wealth levels of $300,000 and $500,000, the most attractive is the 60-strike, three-maturity. In each case, the least attractive option is the 33-strike, five-year maturity. We do find one somewhat contrary result. The 40-strike, 3.5-maturity, which suffers a reduction in maturity, is the third most attractive option for tendering for employees with $100,000 wealth, although it is seventh for the other wealth levels.
In Table V we vary the asset allocation and risk aversion. The former is the percentage of non-option wealth invested in the stock and is set at 0% for the benchmark case, but we now change it to 20% and 50% in Panel A. Note again that the more exposure the employee has to the stock, the more attractive the offer and with a sufficiently high asset allocation, all options are worth tendering. The longer maturity options take a heavy hit, but the 40-strike, 3.5-maturity option ranks low with 0% and 20% asset allocations but ranks second with a 50% asset allocation.
In Panel B, we see that the results are not particularly sensitive to the degree of risk aversion.
For the benchmark case, no offers are attractive for risk aversion from 2.0 to 3.0 and the rankings are similar.
In summary, the offer is more attractive if the employee has a small amount of non-option wealth, a large percentage of wealth invested in Microsoft stock, and a large number of options.
These factors can be summarized by saying that the offer is more attractive the more exposure one has to the stock relative to one's total wealth. Also, the penalty for maturity reduction is a heavy one, so it is unlikely that an employee would tender a longer-term option. Another factor affecting our conclusions, however, is the fact that the estimated differences between the offer and the value assessed by the employee are forecasts. Risk-averse employees, forced to decide about two weeks before the offer is finalized, might well have viewed any small positive expected gains as not worth the risk.
E. Who Tendered What?
In spite of the apparent unattractiveness of the offer, about half of the options were tendered. It would, of course, be interesting to obtain detailed characteristics of the options tendered and the employees who tendered, but that information is not made public. We can, however, attempt to identify the most likely options to be tendered and the most likely employees to tender. Microsoft reported that the average premium paid was $1.11 and the average strike was $38.70. The average strike suggests that there were very few high-strike options tendered, and as we noted earlier, there were likely only a few of these high-strike options outstanding.
In using the average strike and premium paid to reverse engineer and identify the likely maturity and strike of a typical option tendered, we find an unusual result. A strike of $38.70 and maturity of two years would correspond to a premium of $1.34. It would require a maturity of 1.75 years to generate a premium as low as $1.11. Yet we discussed earlier that the minimum likely maturity was two years. Thus, it appears that JPMC priced these options with volatility a lower than 30%, more like 28% to obtain these values.
Given that most options tendered appeared to be somewhat old options (around two years maturity remaining) and with strikes in the $33 to $40 range, it is likely that the employees who tendered were more experienced employees. Employees with two years or less experience are unlikely to have held many eligible options. Recall that that we found that the options were most likely tendered by employees with the highest percentage of their non-option wealth invested in Microsoft stock, employees with a large number of options, and employees with the highest risk aversion. Combining all of these factors suggests that employees who tendered were more likely to be employees with more than two years experience at Microsoft with low wealth and high exposure to the stock. These are also likely to be employees who were poorly diversified. If the program induced these employees to reduce their exposure, it likely increased their expected utility.
It is also possible that employees who tendered had private information or were pessimistic about the company's outlook. These employees were either prescient or lucky because Microsoft's stock price, at around $27 at the time of the deal, never reached $30 over the next two years.
Also, some employees could have taken the offer because of plans to leave the company. Such factors, of course, cannot be incorporated into standard valuation models, but they could explain why some employees tendered when the analysis suggests that few would have done so.
IV. Discussion
We now provide an analysis and discussion of certain qualitative aspects of the program.
A. Was the program Successful?
Recall that Microsoft offered JPMC payments of $6 million regardless of the program's success, an additional $4 million if more than 50% of the options were tendered, and an additional $5 million if more than 75% of the options were tendered. This payment schedule suggests that Microsoft would consider a tender rate of 50% to be moderately successful and a tender rate of 75% to be highly successful. On that basis, the program would be deemed moderately successful, because 55% of the options were tendered. But this tender rate is very low in comparison to the programs of Siebel Systems and Nvidia, in which over 90% of the options were tendered. Recall that those programs were much simpler, offering employees known amounts that appeared to be much larger than the values employees would place on the options for all tranches. Another factor that contributed to the relatively low participation rate of the Microsoft program was almost surely the fact that employees had to decide whether to tender before knowing how much they would receive. In addition, employees may well have been confused about the impact of the averaging process and concerned about the possibility that the short selling of JPMC would drive down the amount offered. As previously shown, such confusion was probably unnecessary, and the averaging process probably helped the employee. The employee could have obtained a reasonable estimate of the amount to be offered by merely inserting the November 12 stock price into the Black-Scholes model. Of course, this conclusion is drawn from a sample of only one event. Other outcomes could have had the ex post value far from the ex ante value, though the short averaging period does minimize this possibility. We also now know that the intensive short selling during the averaging period was easily absorbed by the market, so the employee need not have feared its impact, but the employee would not have known that he had little to worry about before the fact.
And as noted, Microsoft gave exceptionally strong warnings to employees that JPMC's short selling had the potential to drive the stock price down. Employees were almost surely concerned about these factors. Also, the all-or-nothing requirement probably reduced the participation rate.
B. The Requirement to Tender All Options or None
In this section we examine three possible reasons why Microsoft may have chosen the allor-nothing plan. The first is that it might have believed that employees would find that the options they hold with positive gains to tendering more than offset those with negative gains to tendering. The second is that the employees might have been unable to determine the gains from tendering but would have chosen to tender over not tendering. The third is that the all-or-none requirement might have been easier from an administrative standpoint.
Oftentimes an all-or-none requirement is used because of the adverse selection problem. It might appear that an employee could tender the options that were advantageous to tender and retain those that were advantageous to retain, leaving a counterparty at a disadvantage. Let us consider the possible ways the program could have been designed with the adverse selection problem in mind. Assume that there are only two tranches of options, tranche A and tranche B and only one employee who holds one of each tranche. The company considers two programs, Plan 1 permitting the employee to tender either or both options, or Plan 2 requiring the employee to tender both or none. Assume that the values of the options to the employee are V A and V B and that the offer price is O A and O B , respectively. We ignore any uncertainty in the offer price or value for now. Now consider why the company created the program. The company and the employees felt that the options did not provide much incentive. Thus, we assume that the incentive provided by an option is small but non-zero. If the employee holds on to an option, the incentive is retained.
If the employee tenders the option, the incentive is destroyed. Thus, tendering is costly to the company but this cost is clearly very small inasmuch as the options have already been deemed to provide very little incentive. Table VI summarizes the possible outcomes, optimal employee actions and the implications for the employee and Microsoft under the two alternative structures. Under Plan 1 the employee tenders only the options that are worth tendering, while under Plan 2 the employee could find it worthwhile to tender options not worth tendering if the options worth tendering provide gains that more than offset the losses from the options not worth tendering.
There are six conditions represented by the rows. In the first and fourth, the effect on Microsoft is the same under both plans. In the second condition, the marginal impact of the restriction of Plan 2 is the loss of incentive on option B. In the third outcome, Microsoft retains the incentive on option A. In the fifth outcome, the marginal impact of Plan 2 is that Microsoft loses the incentive on option A. In the sixth outcome, the marginal impact is retention of the incentive on option B. Thus, under two of the outcomes, Microsoft would prefer Plan 1, under two it would prefer Plan 2, and under two it would be indifferent. If the outcomes are equally likely, there is no clear preference for either plan. But taking into account the fact that Microsoft is offering the program because it believes the options do not provide much incentive, the cost from the loss of incentives must be very low. The only justification for Plan 2 would be retention of incentives, which it admits are worth very little. Considering the fact that Microsoft would seem to want a high degree of participation, Plan 2 does not appear to be the better alternative.
Moreover, Plan 2 has a greater degree of uncertainty of the number of options tendered.
Under both plans, the expected number of options tendered is the same at 1. But the standard deviation of the number of options tendered is 0.58 under Plan 1 and 1.00 under Plan 2. So, while
Microsoft would expect the same number of options to be tendered under both plans, there is about 70% more uncertainty of the number of tendered options with the all-or-nothing plan.
The above analysis assumes that employees can assess the values of the options and the amounts offered. Now let us assume that there is uncertainty in the assessed values, as in the real case. With the all-or-nothing plan, Microsoft must believe that an employee would be more inclined to tender than not in the presence of uncertainty. Consider a risk-averse employee facing such a decision. If the employee does not tender, his wealth position will be unaffected. If the employee tenders, his wealth will either increase or decrease. Without strong priors pointing to a greater likelihood of a wealth increase from tendering, any risk-averse employee would probably be inclined to not tender.
One final reason Microsoft might have offered the all-or-nothing plan is administrative ease. It is quite possible that it was much easier and less costly to implement the plan on an employee basis rather than on an option-tranche basis. Consider that records of employee options have two dimensions: the option characteristics and the employees. Because not all option tranches would be tendered under any plan, Microsoft would still have multiple option tranches outstanding regardless of how it structures the plan. But under the all-or-none rule, Microsoft would be able to eliminate the administrative costs of having any options owned by a given employee. There could be some savings in this case. While we cannot thoroughly analyze this factor, we should not discount the potential role it could have played in Microsoft's decision. But the all-or-nothing requirement probably reduced the tender rate.
C. Public Commentary and Criticism of the Program
Microsoft was criticized for the program, most notably by renowned compensation expert Graef Crystal, who wrote articles in July and October (Crystal 2003a (Crystal , 2003b in Bloomberg News.
In the first article, Crystal estimated the values of some representative options using the BlackScholes model and noted that the employees would receive considerably less than these values based on preliminary figures mentioned in the email by Steve Ballmer announcing the program.
Crystal also compared the offer to the values of traded options. Unaware at that time that some offers would be even lower due to the reduction in maturity, Crystal argued that the program was not a good deal for employees. He subsequently learned that the option maturities would be shortened and went on in a second article to chastise Microsoft and make extremely derisive comments about employees who turn in their options. For example:
… it seems likely this offer may be best used as a 'selection' device: an employee who turns in his options is fired for stupidity and someone else with more brains is hired. At the least, one casualty of the offer could well be productivity, as employees turn their attention away from designing world-class software. (Crystal, 2003b ).
Crystal also criticized both Microsoft and JPMC for not providing much information to him and the general public, stating that "Microsoft deflected my questions for details at the time by advising me to call JPMC. And JPMC in turn dived to 600 feet and maintained strict radio silence." (Crystal 2003b ). In fact Microsoft provided an extensive amount of information on this program, most of which was available on the Internet.
It should be noted that in an article published around the end of the averaging period, Crystal (2003c) changed his tune, praising JPMC for doing "something socially responsible and useful, while also making a profit." Crystal also notes the educational value of the program in proving to employees that even deep out-of-the-money options have value.
D. Implications for Future Programs
Hall (2004) (Crystal (2003c) , but this action might have been premature.
The bank soon found that the program created a problem it had not anticipated.
E. The Aftermath
On September 1, Reuters News Wire (2005 reported that JPMC was selling the options it had acquired from Microsoft due to large losses that may have begun shortly after the deal was completed. Reuters reported anecdotal estimates of JPMC's losses at anywhere from $100 to $450. The upper range seems unlikely given that the options were acquired for only $382 million. But it is not difficult to determine why large losses were incurred. JPMC evidently failed to consider volatility risk. The offer prices estimated in Table III for 30% volatility for the different tranches were $2.34, $3.49, $1.61, $2.13, $1.07, $1.50, $1.07, and $0.55. The respective vegas are 13.78, 17.34, 13.32, 15.64, 11.12, 13.72, 11.69, and 8.03 . A simple calculation reveals that a 15% reduction in volatility would destroy somewhere between 70 and 100 percent of option value. Similar results are confirmed by using exact recalculations with the 15% volatility. With the hedge executed with short sales of Microsoft stock, there is no offsetting vega from the hedge instrument. So unless JPMC hedged the volatility using a volatility derivative, it likely lost nearly all of the value of the options. Of course, that value could return at a later date if the stock volatility increases.
As noted earlier, employee options have less volatility risk than traded options. By converting employee options into traded options, a considerable amount of volatility risk was created and assumed by JPMC. Employees who tendered, of course, shed all of the risk. Even employees who did not tender did not bear much risk. Consider the employee option values in Table III at a volatility of 30%. It is possible to use the aforementioned employee option valuation model to estimate an average vega from the employee's perspective. These estimates produced vegas of between 2.5 and 7, with an average of 5.56, considerably lower than the average vega of the options assumed by JPMC of about 13.08. Thus, the employees who did not tender had volatility risk of less than half the volatility risk assumed by JPMC, and the employees who did tender eliminated this risk, turning it into much greater risk for JPMC.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The Microsoft employee option transfer program was more complex and far less successful than similar programs. Employees faced uncertainty over the offer amount, concern over how the offer would be determined, and fear of the impact of short selling while the hedge is established.
Ultimately short selling did not have a noticeable effect on the stock, but employees would not have known this at the start, and Microsoft gave very explicit warnings about this risk. After the fact it would have been straightforward to determine the offer amount, but this would not have been obvious before the fact. Given the choice of holding on to their options and being no worse off, or tendering and either being better off or worse off, risk aversion would dictate that most employees would choose not to tender. Another factor that almost surely contributed to the somewhat low tender rate was the fact that an employee had to tender all options or none. There seems to be no obvious economic reason for such a requirement, and it is possible that it might have been for administrative ease. For whatever reason, it was probably a costly one. Overall the findings suggest that employees who tendered were likely those with the most seniority and exposure to Microsoft stock either from stock or other options. Intention of leaving the firm could have also motivated some employees to tender.
JPMorgan Chase received approximately $22 million from Microsoft and probably generated some additional profits from the transactions that set up its hedge. We also find that it probably priced the options with volatility slightly lower than the current volatility. Nonetheless, it assumed considerable volatility risk, failed to hedge that risk, and lost nearly all of the value of the options. In fact, from this outcome we see that such programs in general result in a significant transfer of volatility risk from employees to the financial institution.
There has been considerable interest in recent years in addressing the problem of how illiquidity of employee stock options affects their values. In 2005 Cisco proposed an auction process for a marketable employee stock option but the plan was opposed by the SEC, though a similar plan proposed by Zions Bancorporation was approved in 2007 (Mazumdar et al (2007) ).
Efforts to address the liquidity problem of employee stock options are likely to continue and should benefit from the Microsoft experience. Employees holding stock options are rational investors, like everyone else. Employee option transfer programs should be viewed like wellfunctioning financial markets. Participation is discouraged if transaction costs and search costs are high. Where confusion and uncertainty are high, employees will demand substantial risk premia to participate. Financial institutions that purchase these options must properly assess and manage the risk they assume. The simulation is based on the assumption that 344.6 million options are tendered, the options all have an exercise price of $40 and an expiration, which has been contractually shortened, of three years. The volatility is 30%. The averaging period is 15 trading days and 21 calendar days. The stock price at the beginning of the averaging period is $25.98, and the dividend yield is 1%. The risk-free rate for the threeyear options is 2.31%, the continuously compounded equivalent of the three-year U. S. dollar swap rate. Interest is ignored during the averaging period. The number of simulation runs is 100,000. Prices are computed for options using the Black-Scholes model as the amount offered and an expected utility model that takes into account the option holder's risk aversion, holdings, and wealth along with various other relevant factors in determining employee value. The stock price is $25.98, the exercise price, maturity, and time to vest are shown below, the risk-free rates are maturity-matched continuously compounded yields from the U. S. dollar swaps market interpolated where necessary, the volatility is shown below, and the dividend yield is 1%. The number of options is 15,000, the Microsoft beta is 1.66, the option holder has nonoption wealth of $300,000 allocated completely to risk-free bonds at the start, and the option holder's risk aversion is 2.5. The market risk premium is 6.5%, and exercise proceeds are placed into risk-free bonds. The expected utility model is a binomial model that uses one time step per month and will exercise the option early if the expected utility from exercise exceeds the expected utility from holding the option. *Indicates that the maturity is longer than three years and according to the terms of the buyout offer, the maturity is reduced to three years for purposes of estimating the buyout offer. Prices are computed for options using the Black-Scholes model as the amount offered and an expected utility model that takes into account the option holder's risk aversion, holdings, and wealth along with various other relevant factors in determining the employee value. The number in each cell is the difference between the Black-Scholes value and the employee option value and, thus, represents the gain or loss to the employee from tendering. The stock price is $25.98, the exercise price, maturity, and time to vest are shown below, the risk-free rates are maturity-matched continuously compounded yields from the U. S. dollar swaps market interpolated where necessary, the volatility is 30%, and the dividend yield is 1%. The Microsoft beta is 1.66, wealth is allocated completely to risk-free bonds at the start, and the option holder's risk aversion is 2.5. The market risk premium is 6.5%, and exercise proceeds are placed into risk-free bonds. In Section A, the non-option wealth is $300,000, and the number of options varies as shown. In Section B, the number of options is 15,000, and the non-option wealth varies as shown. The expected utility model is a binomial model that uses one time step per month and will exercise the option early if the expected utility from exercise exceeds the expected utility from holding the option. *Indicates that the maturity is longer than three years and according to the terms of the buyout offer, the maturity is reduced to three years. Prices are computed for options using the Black-Scholes model as the amount offered and an expected utility model that takes into account the option holder's risk aversion, holdings, and wealth along with various other relevant factors in determining the employee value. The number in each cell is the difference between the Black-Scholes value and the employee option value and, thus, represents the gain or loss to the employee from tendering. The stock price is $25.98, the exercise price, maturity, and time to vest are shown below, the risk-free rates are maturity-matched continuously compounded yields from the U. S. dollar swaps market interpolated where necessary, the volatility is 30%, and the dividend yield is 1%. The Microsoft beta is 1.66, the number of options held is 15,000, and the non-option wealth is $300,000. The market risk premium is 6.5%, and exercise proceeds are placed into risk-free bonds. In Section A, the risk aversion is 2.5 and the asset allocation varies as shown. In Section B, the asset allocation is 0% in stock, and the risk aversion varies as shown. The expected utility model is a binomial model that uses one time step per month and will exercise the option early if the expected utility from exercise exceeds the expected utility from holding the option. *Indicates that the maturity is longer than three years and according to the terms of the buyout offer, the maturity is reduced to three years. The table below assumes that there is a single employee and two tranches of options, tranche A and tranche B, with the employee holding one of each tranche. The values of the two options to the employee are V A and V B , and the amounts offered are O A and O B . We assume no uncertainty with respect to these amounts. Plan 1 allows the employee to tender either or both options, and Plan 2 requires that the employee tender both or none. It is assumed that if an employee tenders an option, Microsoft loses the incentives, although these incentives are small because the options are deep out-of-the-money. 
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